Social networks have become important platforms for communication and information exchange. Unfortunately, misinformation and rumor also spread rapidly and widely through online social networks. Therefore, rumor controlling is one of the critical problems in social networks. It is often assumed that there is a single authority whose goal is to minimize the spread of rumor. However, what if there is no such an authority, and instead, there are some distributed agents who generate positive cascades but try to maximize their own private utilities? Can the negative information be blocked effectively by these agents who do not cooperate with each other? To answer these problems, we in this paper formulate the rumor blocking game and provide a game-theoretical analysis. According to whether or not the agents are aware of the rumor, we herein develop the rumor-aware game and the rumor-oblivious game, respectively. We show that the stable state (i.e. Nash Equilibrium) of the game guarantees the 2-approximation and 2·e−1 e−1 -approximation under the scenarios of best-response and approximate-response, respectively. As verified by the experiments performed on realworld networks, the rumor blocking game is effective in limiting the spread of rumor.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the recent advancements of information science, social networks have significantly changed the world by allowing efficient interchange of ideas and innovations. Especially in online social networks of which there is a drastic usage in the past decade, the hitting news may break out even before officially announced [1] . However, misinformation or rumor also spreads through the network [4] , which may lead serious public panic or economic consequence. Therefore, rumor controlling has become one of the important issues in social networks research.
The topics regarding rumor controlling are closely related to the study of influence diffusion in social networks. In a social network, it is assumed that information spreads in the fashion of influence cascades. Under the classic models, a cascade starts to spread from a set of seed users, and then propagates from active users to inactive users. Rumor is taken as a certain cascade spreading along with other cascades, where the cascades holding opposite opinions may compete against each other. In particular, a user who has received the genuine news will not accept the rumor. Conversely, when rumor comes first, undesirable effect can be caused immediately and therefore the true fact arriving later is futile. For example, when affected by the misinformation of swine flu on Twitter, people might G. Tong have taken mistake vaccines before receiving the clarification from WHO. Therefore, to prevent people from being misled by rumor, a nature method is to introduce a positive cascade that is able to reacher users earlier than rumor. That is, once the rumor is detected, the network manager generates a competing positive cascade by selecting appropriate seed users such that the number of rumor-activated users can be minimized. Motivated by this framework, several works (e.g., [5] - [7] ) have studied the rumor blocking problem under the competitive diffusion models.
Despite that many works have been devoted to this topic, the existing approaches may not be able to handle some real cases. On one hand, due to the great magnitude of a social network, the whole network cannot be efficiently controlled by a single manager. For a more realistic scenario, there are usually more than one positive cascades generated by different users or institutes which we call the agents. Although all fight against rumor, when designing rumor containment strategies, such agents do not cooperate with each other. Specifically, each agent makes their own choice according to the actions of other agents such that its own utility can be maximized, which forms a game between the agents. Different from the traditional mode of rumor blocking where a single authority determines all the seed nodes, the budget in the rumor blocking game is distributed into the agents and each agent decides a small part of the seed nodes. Under this setting, the social objective is the number of rumor-activated users while the private utility of each agent varies under different scenarios. In this paper, we study such a non-cooperative game. In particular, we focus on the problem that how bad can the equilibrium of the game be in the worst-case compared with the optimal seeding strategy, with respect to the number of non-rumor-activated nodes.
By extending the classic independent cascade model, we herein develop the peer-to-peer independent cascade (PIC) model supporting the multiple-cascade diffusion. Unlike the existing models, the PIC model assumes that an active user can only activate one inactive neighbor in each time step. The PIC model represents the private social communication where the content is not open to all the users in the network, e.g., the mobile social network where the communication is established by mobile phones in a person-to-person manner. Based on the PIC model, we formulate the rumor blocking game with one cascade of rumor and k agents where each agent generates one positive cascade. In such a game, the social utility is the number of rumor-activated nodes, which is a function over the strategy space of the agents. In this paper, we first show that under the PIC model the social utility is a set function arXiv:1711.07412v1 [cs.SI] 20 Nov 2017 of the union of the seed sets of the positive cascades, and furthermore, it is monotone increasing and submodular. For the private utility, we consider two games, the rumor-aware game and the rumor-oblivious game, depending on whether or not the agents are able to distinguish the rumor from genuine news. For the proposed games, we provide the analysis on the equilibrium under the best-response assumption and the approximate-response assumption, respectively. Under the former, the agents are able to make optimal decisions and the stable state of the game provides a 2-approximation with respect to the social utility. In another issue, we consider that case that the agents cannot obtain the optimal strategy in polynomial time due to the NP-hard nature of the problem. As shown later, the private utility is submodular and it is wellknown that the submodular maximization problem admits an efficient (1 − 1/e)-approximation. Assuming that the agents adopt such an approximation strategy, we prove that the equilibrium of the rumor blocking game provides a 2·e−1 e−1approximation. We simulate the rumor blocking game on real-world social networks and record the number of nodes influenced by rumor. The experimental results have shown that the effect of non-cooperative rumor blocking game is comparable to that of the traditional cooperative game under the state-of-the-art rumor blocking methods.
Besides the analysis of the rumor blocking game, we further discuss the property of the completive diffusion models. When developing such kind of models, there are two critical settings. One is to determine which cascade should a user u select when multiple cascades reach u at the same time. Another one is the order of activation. That is, when a node become active, which of its neighbor will be firstly selected for activation. The activation order of the neighbors plays an important role for the diffusion of multiple cascades because the node is activated by the first cascade reaching it. As discussed later in Sec. VII, such issues becomes tricky and complicated when there are more than two cascades. For example, under certain reasonable settings, when one more positive cascade appear in the network, the rumor may paradoxically spread more widely 1 . In this paper, we will discuss such issues and provide several interesting observations on the property of competitive independent cascade model.
Contribution. The contribution of this paper is summarized as follows.
• We propose a new competitive cascade model which represents the private peer-to-peer communication in social systems. • We formulate the rumor blocking game and provide the analysis of the equilibrium regarding the effect of rumor blocking. In particular, the social utility can be guaranteed with a provable ratio. • We discuss the property of the competitive cascade model under different settings of cascade priority and activation order. Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Sec. II we survey the related work. In Sec. III, we provide the preliminaries and formulate the PIC model. The properties of the social utility are discussed in Sec. IV, and the analysis of the rumor blocking games is shown in Sec. IV. We show the experimental results in Sec. VI. In Sec. VII, we discuss the property of competitive cascade models under different settings. Sec. VIII concludes.
II. RELATED WORK Rumor controlling has drawn significant attention from both academia and industry. In what follows, we briefly introduce the prior works related to this topic.
Rumor detection aims to distinguish rumor from genuine news. Leskovec et al. [9] develop a framework for tracking the spread of misinformation and observe a set of persistent temporal patterns in the news cycle. Ratkiewicz et al. [10] build a machine learning framework to detect the early stages of viral spreading of political misinformation. In [11] , Qazvinian et al. address this problem by exploring the effectiveness of three categories of features: content-based, network-based, and microblog-specific memes. Takahashi et al. later [12] study the characteristics of rumor and design a system to detect the rumor on Twitter.
Rumor source detection is another important problem for rumor controlling. The prior works primarily focus on the classic susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model where the nodes can be infected by rumor and may recover later. Shah et al. [13] provide a systematic study and design a rumor source estimator based upon the concept of rumor centrality. Z. Wang et al. [14] later study this problem with the consideration of multiple observations.
The rumor blocking problem is mainly considered under the influence-propagation models. The study of influence diffusion can be tracked back to Domingos et al. [15] . Later in the seminal work of Kempe et al. [16] , two basic operational models, Independent Cascade model (IC) and Linear Threshold model (LT), are proposed. Based on those models, advanced models supporting multiple cascades are then developed and the competitive influence diffusion problem has been studied in such models. Bharathi et al. [17] show a (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for the best response to an opponent's strategy. Borodin et al. [18] study several competitive diffusion models by extending of the classic LT model and show that the original greedy approach proposed in [16] may not be applicable to such settings. The rumor blocking problem is similar but not identical to the competitive influence maximization problem. The goal of the competitive influence maximization problem is to maximize the spread of a certain cascade while rumor blocking aims to minimize the spread of rumor (i.e. minimize the number of rumor-activated nodes). For the rumor blocking problem, Xinran et al. [7] show a (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm for the competitive Linear Threshold Model, and, Lidan et al. [5] study this problem under the OPOAO model and DOAM model. From another perspective, Nguyen et al. [1] propose the β I T -Node Protector problem which limits the spread of misinformation by blocking the high influential nodes. The above works all aim to design seeding algorithms, which is essentially different from the topic of this paper.
Note that we are not the first who study the influence diffusion via game theoretical approaches. Kostka et al. [19] formulate the seeding process as a game and study the bestresponse strategy under a new model which is more restricted than the IC and LT model. Different from that paper, we do not design response strategies and instead our analysis focuses on the equilibrium of the game where there is one rumor cascade and multiple positive cascades. In another issue, C. Jiang et al. in [2] , [3] propose an evolutionary game theoretic framework to model the dynamic information diffusion process in social networks.
III. DIFFUSION MODEL
In this section, we introduce the system model and provide the preliminaries. The notations that frequently used in this paper are listed in Table I .
A. Influence Model
A social network is given by a directed graph G = (V, E) where V and E denote the users and social ties, respectively. Let N u = {v|(u, v) ∈ E} be the set of the out-neighbors of node u and let d u = |N u |. We will use terms user and node interchangeably. We speak of each user as being active and inactive. To trigger the spread of influence, some users are firstly activated as seed users who will later attempt to activate their out-neighbors. Under the independent cascade model, associated with each edge (u, v) there is a propagation probability p G (u,v) ∈ [0, 1] which is the probability that u successfully activates v. For each pair of nodes u and v, u has only one chance to activate v. The diffusion process goes round by round. By the fashions of influence propagation, the independent cascade model can be classified into the following two categories.
Broadcast Independent Cascade (BIC) model. 2 Under this model, when node u becomes active at time t − 1, it attempt to activates all of its out-neighbors simultaneously at time step t.
P2P Independent Cascade (PIC) model. Under this model, an active node u can only attempt to activate one of its out-neighbors at one time step. Example 1. An illustrative example for the above two models is shown in Fig. 1 . Suppose the propagation probability of each edge is 1 and node v 3 is selected as seed node. As shown in the figures, after the first step, all the neighbors of v 3 are activated under the BIC model, while only one neighbor of v 3 is activated under the PIC model.
The BIC model represents the open social communication namely Facebook or Twitter. For example, a public post on
Facebook is simultaneously available to all the user's friends. The PIC model represents the private social communication such as personal online message or email. Note that, for the rumor blocking problem, there is a significant difference between these two models. One can see that the PIC model 2 This is the model that has been considered in most of the prior works [16] , [20] - [22] . 
propagation probability of edge (u, v). C r the cascade of rumor. a r the seed set of rumor. b t u the neighbors of u that can be activated by u at time step t. g a realization.
Pr[g]
the probability that the realization g can be generated. k the number of agents. tends to slow the spread of influence, and when multiple cascades exist whether a node will be rumor-activated depends on the first cascade reaching it. In this paper, we focus on the PIC model which has not been studied in literature. Suppose there are multiple cascades each of which is generated by its own seed set. Denote by C r the cascade generated by rumor with a fixed seed set a r . The basic definitions are shown as follows.
Definition 1. For a certain cascade C, we call a node Cactive (resp. C-active) if it is activated (resp. not activated) by cascade C.
Definition 2 (Cascade Priority). Each cascade is assigned a distinct priority and we assume that the rumor always has the highest priority. We denote by Priority(C) the priority of cascade C and, for two cascades C 1 and C 2 , Priority(C 1 ) < Priority(C 2 ) if and only if cascade C 2 has a higher priority than that of cascade C 1 .
Algorithm 1 Realization Generation
Output: A realization g = (Vg, Eg) together with α g u for each node u and p g e for each e. 3: Vg ← V and Eg ← E; 4: for each edge e ∈ E do 5: rand ← a random number from 0 to 1 generated in uniform; 6: if rand ≤ p G e then 7:
p g e ← 1;
8:
p g e ← 0; 10: for each node u ∈ V do 11: α g u ← a permutation of Nu generated uniformly at random; 12: Return g, p g e and α g u ;
Definition 3 (Activation Order). Let b t u be the set of the node v such that v ∈ N u and u has not tried to activate v before time t. At time step t, an active node u will uniformly at random select a node in b t u to activate 3 . Recall that the PIC model represents the private communication and consequently a user cannot know whether the other users have been activated or not. Therefore, one user may try to activate another user who has already been activated by others.
B. Diffusion Process
Given a PIC network G and the seed sets of the cascades, the diffusion process unfolds in discrete, as described in following.
• Time step 0. Each cascade C activates its seed nodes. If one node is selected by more than one cascades, it will be activated by the cascade with the highest priority. • Time step t > 0. Each active node u randomly select one node v in b t u and activates v with a success probability of p G (u,v) , where each node in b t u has the same probability to be selected by u. If u is C-active and u successfully activates v then v is C-active. If a node is successfully activated by two or more neighbors pertaining to different cascades, it will be activated by the cascade with the highest priority. The PIC model is a probabilistic model where the randomness comes from that (1) at each step who to select to activate and (2) whether the activation succeeds. The following definition shows a derandomization process of a PIC model.
is a special PIC network randomly constructed as shown in Algorithm 1. First, V g = V and E g = E. The propagation probability p g e of each edge e in g is either 0 or 1 determined in random. In particular, for each edge e, the probability that p g e = 1 (resp. p g e = 0) is p G e (resp. 1−p G e ). Each node u randomly decides a permutation α g u (i.e., an order) of all its out-neighbors N u in G where each possible permutation of N u has the same probability to be selected by u. We take a permutation α g u as a one-to-one mapping from N u to {1, ..., |N u |}. In g, the activation order of the our-neighbors of u is determined by the permutation α g u . That is, when u 3 Other kinds of activation orders will be discussed later in Sec. VII.
becomes active, u selects its neighbor to activate one by one according to the order given by α g u . The cascade priority in g remains the same as that in G. Furthermore, we assign a weight of each edge in g.
For two nodes u and v, let dis g (u, v) be the length of the shortest path from u to v in g. For a node set V and a node v, define that dis g (V , v) = min u∈V dis g (u, v). For a certain realization g, let Pr[g] be the probability that g can be generated by Algorithm 1.
One can see that each realization g corresponds to a basic event of the PIC model. If an edge (u, v) has a probability of 1 in g, then it means u can successfully activate v. The weight w g (u, v) of an edge (u, v) implies that if u is activated at time t then it will try to activate v at time t + w g (u, v).
The following theorem shows the relationship between a PIC network and its realizations.
Given the seed set of each cascade, the following two diffusion processes are the equivalent to each other, with respect to the distribution of the spreading results.
• a. Execute the stochastic diffusion process on the PIC network G. • b. Randomly generate a realization g of G according to Algorithm 1, and execute the deterministic diffusion process on g.
Proof. See appendix A.
In the next section, we will discuss the property of the rumor blocking game where Theorem 1 plays an important role.
IV. ACTION SPACE AND SOCIAL UTILITY
Suppose there are k agents and let B i be the budget of the i-th agent. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, denote by C i the cascade of the i-th agent and let a i be the selected seed set where |a i | = B i 4 .
Definition 5 (Action Space). The action space A i of the i-th agent is
specifies the seed sets selected by the agents.
Given a full-action A = (a 1 , ..., a k ), let σ i (A) be the expected number of C i -active nodes under A and γ(A) be the expected number of C r -active nodes under A. For a fullaction A = (a 1 , ..., a k ) and a realization g, let γ g (A) be the number of C r -active nodes in g under A, and σ g i (A) be the number of C i -active nodes in g. By Theorem 1,
and
Definition 7 (Strategy Space). The strategy space S i of the i-th agent is the set of the distributions on all the actions, i.e.,
where s j implies that action a j ∈ A i is implemented with a probability of s j under strategy s. We define the empty strategy ∅ as (0,...,0). A full-strategy S = (s 1 , ..., s k ) ∈ S 1 ×S 2 ×...×S k specifies the strategy adopted by each agent.
Definition 8 (Social Utility). For a full-strategy S of the agents, let
be the social utility over the distribution given by S, where Pr(A|S) is the probability that the full-action A is implemented according to S.
For a fixed realization g and a full-action A = (a 1 , ..., a k ), the outcome of the influence diffusion in g under A is determined. Let t g A (u) be the time that u becomes active in g under A.
Lemma 1. For two nodes u 1 and u 2 , and any simple path P =
The property follows inductively from u 1 to u 2 along the given path. Corollary 1. Given a realization g and a full-action A, for any node u and v where v is a seed selected by one or more
Since v is a seed node, t g A (u) = 0. The corollary directly follows from Lemma 1.
The next lemma provides the condition for a node u to be rumor-activated in a realization g under a full-action A.
Lemma 2. Given a full-action A = (a 1 , ..., a k ) and a realization g, a node u * will be activated by rumor C r in g under process b defined in Theorem 1 ⇔ dis g (a r , u * ) ≤ dis g (a i , u * ) for each i and dis g (a r , u * ) = +∞ 5 .
Proof. See Appendix B.
One can see that the minimum of dis g (a i , u * ) only depends on the union of the positive seed sets and therefore the social utility is a set function, shown as follows.
Lemma 3. For a full-action A = (a 1 , ..., a k ), let A * = a 1 ∪ a 2 ∪ ... ∪ a k be the union of the seed sets of the agents. γ(A) is a set function on A * . That is, for any two full actions A 1 and
Proof. It suffices to show that, for any realization g and two full actions
Let u be an arbitrary C r -active node in g under A 1 = (a 1 , ..., a k ).
By Lemma 2, dis g (a r , u) > dis g (a i , u) for some i or dis g (a r , u) = ∞. If dis g (a r , u) = ∞, then there is no path from any rumor seed to u and therefore u cannot be activated by rumor in g under A 2 . Now suppose dis g (a r , u) = ∞ and dis g (a r , u) > dis g (v i , u) for some i and some v i ∈ a i . Since A * 1 = A * 2 , v i must be a seed node of some agent i * in A 2 and therefore dis g (a r , u) < dis g (a i * , u), which means u is also C r -active in g under A 2 . By the above analysis, γ g (A 1 ) ≤ γ g (A 2 ). It can be easily seen that γ g (A 2 ) ≤ γ g (A 1 ) can be proved in the similar manner, and therefore γ g (A 1 ) = γ g (A 2 ).
Since γ g () is a set function, for any X ⊆ V , let γ g (X) denote the number of C r -active nodes in g when the union of the seed sets of positive cascades is X. It is worthy to note that in some other models γ g () may not be a set function of the union of positive seed sets, as discussed in Sec. VII.
A set function f :
Lemma 4. γ() is monotone increasing and submodular.
Proof. By Theorem 1, we only need to show that γ g () is monotone increasing and submodular for each realization g. Due to Lemma 2, γ g () is clearly monotone increasing. To prove the submodularity, it suffices to show that, for each realization g,
is the number of nodes that are C r -active under Y but C r -active under Y ∪ {v}. Now let us consider such a node u. Since u is C r -active under Y ∪ {v}, dis g (a r , u) = +∞. By Lemma 2, dis g (a r , u) ≤ dis g (Y, u) and dis g (a r , u) > dis g (Y ∪ {v}, u), which means dis g (a r , u) > dis g ({v}, u). Because X is a subset of Y , dis g (X, u) ≥ dis g (Y, u) ≥ dis g (a r , u) and thus u will be C r -active in g under X. Meanwhile, u cannot be C r -active in g under X ∪ {v} because dis g (X ∪ {v}, u) ≤ dis g ({v}, u) < dis g (a r , u). Therefore, each node that contributes 1 to the right-hand side of Eq. (2) must contribute 1 to the left-hand side. Eq. (2) thus follows.
Definition 9. For a full-strategy S = (s 1 , ..., s k ), a fullaction A = (a 1 , ..., a k ) and an integer i ≤ k, let S i = (s 1 , ..., s i , ∅, ..., ∅) and A i = (a 1 , ..., a i , ∅, ..., ∅). For a fullaction A = (a 1 , ..., a k ), we denote by A(i, a i ) the full-action where the i-th agent replaces its strategy a i in A by a i . Similarly we have the notation S(i, s i ) for a full-strategy S and a strategy s i of the i-th agent.
By Lemma 4, we have the following corollary.
V. THE GAMES Now, let us consider the private utility of the games. In this paper, we consider two games.
A. Rumor-aware Game
In a social network, the agents holding positive cascades may be able to identify the cascade of opposite opinions. Therefore, assuming the agents are aware of the rumor, the private utility δ i () of the i-th agent is
which is the effort made by the i-th agent to limit the spread of rumor. For a full-action A, let δ i (A) = γ(A) − γ(A(i, ∅)).
We denote this game as the rumor-aware game.
Since the agents aim to maximize δ i (A) and the rumor has the highest priority, we can assume a i ∩ a r = ∅ without loss of generality.
For a full-strategy S, it reaches the Nash Equilibrium if any player cannot gain more by changing his/her own strategy. That is,
for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and each s i in S i . Due to Nash [24] , the finite k-agent non-cooperative game always has at least one Nash equilibrium. In the following, we will show that any Nash equilibrium of the rumor-aware game guarantees the social utility with a provable ratio compared to the optimal strategy. A game is a valid utility system if, under any full-strategy S, (a) the private utility is not less than the marginal social utility and (b) the total private utility is not larger than the social utility. That is
Theorem 2. The rumor-aware game is a valid utility system under the PIC model.
Proof. See Appendix D.
According to Vetta et al. [25] , if the social utility is a submodular set function, the Nash equilibrium the game guarantees the social utility by a factor of 2. In particular, we have the following result. [25] Suppose a full-strategy S forms a Nash equilibrium of the rumor-aware game, and let Ω be the fullstrategy such that γ(Ω) is maximized. Then, γ(S) ≥ ( 1 2 )·γ(Ω). Recall that in the rumor-aware game the social value is the expected number of C r -active nodes while the private utility is the effort made by each agent to limit the spread of rumor. Due to the nature of non-cooperation, each agent only concerns his/her marginal contribution. Nevertheless, Corollary 3 shows that the social utility will not be arbitrarily far from the optimal and in fact it guarantees a 2-approximation. Intuitively speaking, even if there is no powerful authority dealing with rumor Algorithm 2 Simple Game 1: A ← (∅, ..., ∅); 2: sign ← true; 3: while A = A do
4:
A ← A ; 5: for i = 1 : k do 6: v ← arg max v∈V δ i (A(i, {v}));
7:
A ← A(i, {v});
8: Return A;
in a social network, the rumor can be efficiently blocked by the users who participate and propagate positive information.
A pure full-strategy is a special full-strategy where each the i-th agent decides to carry out one specific action. When a full-strategy S = {s 1 , ..., s k } is pure, each s i is a vector of 0 and 1. In other words, the pure full-strategy reduces to the full-action. Specifically, the Nash Equilibrium formed by a pure full-strategy is called pure Nash Equilibrium. Note that there always exists an optimal strategy Ω which is pure. For general games, the Nash equilibrium may not be pure. However, the real users usually make pure strategies instead of making decisions according to a distribution. The following result shows that for the rumor-aware game the pure Nash equilibrium always exists.
Theorem 3. For the rumor-aware game, there exists a fullaction Φ such that δ i (Φ) ≥ δ i (Φ(i, a i )) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k and each action a i of the i-th agent.
Proof. Let Φ 0 be an arbitrary full-action and consider the following process to generate a series of full-actions Φ 0 , ..., Φ m . For the full-action Φ j , if for some i there exists an action a i such that δ i (Φ j ) < δ i (Φ j (i, a i )), we denote Φ(i, a i ) as Φ j+1 . By such process, we finally obtain a sequence of fullactions Φ j . According to the construction, for any Φ j and Φ j+1 , there exists some i such that δ i (Φ j ) < δ i (Φ j+1 ), which means γ(Φ j ) < γ(Φ j+1 ). Therefore, any two full-actions in the sequence cannot be identical. Since the action space is finite, the sequence Φ j must be finite and the last full-action reaches the pure Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 3 implies that we can build the Nash equilibrium starting from any full-action by increasing the private utility of some agent.
In the prior works, the goal is to block the rumor by introducing a competing cascade. Due to the expense of activating seed nodes, there is a budget of the seed nodes. In our rumor blocking game, such a budget is distributed to multiple agents. Suppose the budget is distributed to k agents where each agent has one budget and the agents make decision in turn, and the agents always make pure decision. The evolution of the Nash equilibrium is shown in Algorithm 2. We denote the game under such a setting as Simple Game.
The result shown in Corollary 3 requires that each agent follows the best response policy.
Best Response. For the i-th agent, given the actions a 1 , ..., a i−1 , a i+1 , ..., a k of other agents, find a seed set a i that such that γ(A) − γ(A(i, ∅)) is maximized, where A = (a 1 , ..., a k ).
However, the agent in real case may not be able to efficiently 6 find such an optimal action that maximizes the private utility. One can see that, the Simple Game allows polynomial best-response as B i = 1 for each agent, while it is NP-hard to obtain the best response for the i-th agent when B i is not a constant. In this case, polynomial approximation method is the best that each agent can adopt. According to Lemma 4, given the seed sets of other agents, δ i () is also monotone increasing and submodular, and therefore the i-th agent can easily obtain an action a i such that δ(A(i, a i )) ≥ (1 − e −1 ) · γ(A(i, a * i ), where a * i is the best response [26] . Approximate Response. Given the actions A(i, ∅) of other agents, the i-th agent is able to find a seed set a i that such that δ i (A(i, a i )) ≥ (1 − 1 e ) · δ i (A(i, a i )) for any a i ∈ A i . In this case, the stable of the game reaches an approximate Nash equilibrium. The next result shows that such an equilibrium guarantees the social utility within a factor of 2e+1 e+1 . Lemma 5. Let A = (a 1 , ..., a k ) be a pure Nash equilibrium under the approximate response. Then γ(
where Ω is the optimal pure full-action that maximizes γ().
Proof. See Appendix C.
Theorem 4. If each agent adopts the (1 − e −1 )-approximate response, the Nash equilibrium guarantees an 2·e−1 e−1approximation with respect of the expected number of C ractive nodes.
Proof. Since γ() is a set function and γ(Ω * ) ≤ γ(A * ∪ Ω * ), the theorem directly follows from Lemma 5.
B. Rumor-oblivious Game
In another issue, the rumor may be well disguised such that they cannot be distinguished from the genuine news. In this case, the best that an agent can do is to maximize the spread of its own cascade. Therefore, the private utility δ i () of the i-th agent is δ i (S) = σ i (S), where
Such a game is called rumor-oblivious game. In the following, we will show that the rumor-oblivious game also forms a valid utility system. However, the proof slightly differs from that of the rumor-aware game.
Lemma 6. The rumor-oblivious game is a valid utility system under the PIC model.
Proof. In order to prove Eq. (4), it suffices to show that σ g i (A) ≥ γ g (A) − γ g (A(i, ∅)) holds for each full-action A and each realization g. Note that γ g (A) is a set function on A * and it is monotonically increasing. Therefore, the right-hand side is number of nodes that are C r -active under A but C r -active under A(i, ∅). Let u be such a node that contribute 1 to the right-hand side. According to Lemma 2, 6 Ideally decisions shall be made in polynomial time.
dis g (a i , u) < dis g (a r , u) ≤ dis g (a j , u) for j = i. Thus, u must be C i -active under A in g and therefore also contributes 1 to the left-hand side. Eq. (4) thus proved. Now to prove Eq. (5), it suffices to show that k i=1 δ g i (A) ≤ γ g (A) holds for each A and g. Note that γ g (A) is the number of C r -active nodes, i.e., the nodes activated by the positive cascades together with the nodes that are not activated by any cascade. Therefore, Eq. (5) follows directly. where Ω is the full-strategy maximizing γ().
As widely discussed in prior works e.g. [17] , given the actions of other agents, σ i (A) is also monotone and submodular with respect to the seed set of the i-th agent. Therefore, similar to the analysis in Sec. V, the agents in the rumor-oblivious game are also able to make the (1 − 1/e)-approximate pure response. However, unlike the rumor-aware game, there may not be a 2·e−1 e−1 -approximation equilibrium for the rumoroblivious game. This is because the pure Nash equilibrium may not exist in the rumor-oblivious game.
VI. EXPERIMENT
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the effect of the proposed rumor blocking game by comparing it with the traditional rumor blocking game where there is only one positive cascade. In particular, we first simulate the behavior of the agents and obtain the seed nodes, and then run the diffusion process to see how many users will be influenced by rumor. Finally, we compare such results with that of the seeding algorithms designed for the traditional rumor blocking problem under the same budget limit.
A. Setup
Our experiments are performed on a sever with 16 GB ram and a 3.6 GHz quadcore processor running 64-bit JAVA VM 1.6.
Dataset. The first dataset, denoted by Facebook, is collected from Facebook social platform, provided by Stanford Network Analysis Project 7 . The Facebook dataset contains 4,039 nodes with 88,234 edges and it has been widely used in prior works [27] - [29] . Another real-world social network is an academic collaboration from co-authorships in physics, denoted by Hep. This dataset is compiled from the "High Energy Physics-Theory" section of the e-print arXiv 8 , including about 15,000 nodes and 58,000 edges. Hep dataset has been studied in [16] , [30] , [31] and [32] .
Propagation Probability. In the experiments, we consider three settings of the probability on the edges. In the first and second settings, the probability of each edge is uniformly set as 0.1 and 0.01, respectively. The third setting follows the classic weighted cascade model [16] where p G (u,v) = 1/d v and d v is the number of out-neighbors of node v. Seeds of Rumor. The seed nodes of rumor are selected from the nodes with the highest degree. The number of the rumor seeds will be discussed later.
Methods. Given a social network and a budget k, we deploy k agents each of which has one budget. The seed nodes are obtained by simulating the Simple Game developed in Sec. IV. The diffusion result of the Simple Game is labeled as Game. We compare the effectiveness of the rumor blocking game with the following methods.
• Greedy. This is the state-of-the-art rumor blocking algorithm. Given a budget k, we assume there is one positive cascade with k seed nodes in which the nodes are decided by successively adding the node that can maximize the social value. Such a method provides a (1 − 1/e)-approximation due to the submodularity and it has been wildly used in the prior works [5]- [7] . • MaxDegree. Assuming there is one positive cascade, MaxDegree selects the k users in V \ a r with the highest degree. • Random. Assuming there is one positive cascade, Random selects k seed nodes in random. • NoBlocking. This is the case when there is no positive cascade. Another popular heuristic rumor blocking algorithm, called Proximity, which selects the neighbor of rumor seed nodes as positive seed nodes, is not included in our experiments, because its performance is worse than that of Greedy as shown in [7] and [5] . Due to space limitation, we will not discuss all combinations of the above settings. For a given full-action (i.e., the seed sets of each cascade) and a specified network, γ(A) is calculated by taking the average of 10,000 simulations.
B. Results
In the first experiment, the number of seed nodes of rumor is set from 1 to 30 and the budget k is equal to the number of rumor seed nodes. The results of this experiment on Facebook under the three propagation probability settings are shown in Figs. 2a, 2b and 2c . As shown in the figures, when the propagation probability is 0.01, the effectiveness of Game is slightly worse than that of Greedy. Under the other two settings of propagation probability, the equilibrium of the game has the same degree of effect as Greedy does in limiting the spread of rumor. The result of this experiment done on Hep is shown in Fig. 2d . In this case, Game provides the best performance among all the considered methods. In general, both of the Game and Greedy are effective for rumor containment. However, under different settings and network structures, the patterns of the curves are diverse. The first observation is that the spread of rumor may have a saturation point with respect to the number of seed nodes. For the cases shown in Figs. 2a and 2b , the number of C r -active nodes under NoBlocking will not notably increase when k is larger than 5. Nevertheless, in Fig. 2d , the number of C r -active nodes continuously increases with the increase of k. Another observation is that when k increases by one the number of C ractive nodes does not necessarily increase. As shown in Fig.  2c , when one rumor seed and one agent are added at k = 15, the number of C r -active nodes decreases by about 500 under Game. Such a case suggests that the marginal effect of adding one seed node not only depends on the selection of the seed nodes but also on the network structure.
In the second experiment, we fix the number of rumor seed nodes and see how the number of C r -active nodes varies with the increase of the budget k. The results of the experiments under three different settings are shown as Figs. 3a, 3b and 3c. One can see that when more budget is added the number of C r -active nodes become less and less. On the Facebook network, when p G (u,v) is equal to 0.1 and |a r | is set as 20, as shown in Fig. 3a , the number of C r -active nodes decreases significantly under Game and Greedy but hardly changes under MaxDegree and Random, which implies that the agent should not arbitrarily select seed nodes or use simple heuristics. For the case shown in Fig. 3c , one can see that adding the first positive seed node can reduce the number of C r -active nodes by a half. Such a scenario answers the submodularity nature of the rumor blocking problem and indicates that the first several actions of the agents are important.
In the third experiment, we fix both the number of rumor seeds and budget k, and record the number of C r -active nodes round by round. That is, we take the snapshots of the first two experiments and examine how fast the rumor spread under different cases. The results are shown in Figs. 4a, 4b and 4c. As indicated by the figures, the equilibrium of the game formulated in this paper can effectively limit the spread of rumor. Furthermore, under appropriate strategies, the rumor can be blocked in an early stage. For example, in Fig. 4b , the number of C r -active nodes stops increasing at about the eighth round under Game. However, it increases until the eleventh round under MaxDegree.
VII. FURTHER DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide several observations concerning the competitive diffusion model. The discuss herein may help us further understand the scenario when more than two cascades exist.
One of the critical issues is that how the nodes make selections when more than two cascades arrive at the same time. Recall that in this paper we assume that the priority of the cascades is fixed and the rumor has the highest priority. As shown in the prior works, there exists alternative settings for this issue. We will in the following show that how such setting may affect our rumor blocking game.
First, let us consider the other settings for the fixed priority. Recall that the social utility γ() is a set function in our rumor blocking. However, if the cascade priority is fixed but the rumor does not have the highest priority, then γ(A) may not be a set function. Consider the PIC social network shown in Fig. 5a and 5b, where p G e = 1 for each edge e. Suppose a r = {v 2 } and there are two agents with cascades C 1 and C 2 respectively. Now we consider the case that Priority(C 1 ) ≤ Priority(C r ) ≤ Priority(C 2 ). One can easily check that action A 1 = ({v 1 }, {v 3 }) and A 2 = ({v 3 }, {v 1 }) result different values of social utility. Under action A 1 , v 4 will be activated by the rumor seed v 2 and therefore many nodes will be later activated by rumor spreading from v 4 . However, under A 2 , only the node v 2 will be activated by rumor as v 4 will be activated by cascade C 1 . Thus, γ(A 1 ) = γ(A 2 ) even if A * 1 = A * 2 . Now we discuss the case when each node has its own priority setting for cascades. Such a setting has been adopted in prior works e.g. [18] . We observe that under this setting, the social utility may decrease when more agents join in game. Consider the illustration example shown in Fig. 5c , where each p G e = 1 for each edge e and a r = {v 3 }. Suppose there are two agents C 1 and C 2 . For v 4 and v 5 , the priority for the cascades is Priority(C 2 ) < Priority(C 1 ) < Priority(C r ) and Priority(C 1 ) ≤ Priority(C r ) ≤ Priority(C 2 ), respectively. Consider two actions A 1 and A 2 where A 1 = ({v 1 }, ∅) and A 2 = ({v 1 }, {v 2 }). Under A 1 there is only one agent in the game and v 5 will be activated by C 1 because C 1 has the higher priority than C r at v 5 . However, when another agent joins the game as shown by A 2 , v 5 will become C r -active because v 4 will be activated by C 2 and Priority(C r ) ≤ Priority(C 2 ) at v 4 . Therefore, under this setting, γ(A) may not be monotone increasing with respect to A * .
Finally, let us consider the problem that whether an active node will try to activate the nodes that have been activated by other cascades. Note that we in this paper assume that a node may try to activate the neighbor that has been active. It is worthy to note that if each node only attempts to activate inactive neighbors, then γ(A) is not monotone increasing under the PIC model. An example is shown in Fig. 5d . Again we assume that each edge has the probability of 1, a r = {v 2 } and there are two agents. Suppose each node only selects inactive node to activate and v 4 will activate v 1 and v 5 in order after becoming active. Consider the two actions A 1 = ({v 3 }, ∅) and A 2 = ({v 3 }, {v 1 }). One can see that v 5 will be activated by C 1 under A 1 because at the second step v 4 will activate v 1 after rumored by v 2 . Nevertheless, if another agent participates and selects v 1 as the seed node, as shown in A 2 , then v 5 will be rumor-activated by v 4 , because at the second step v 4 will not try to activate v 1 as v 1 has been activated in the first step. Thus, when more agents come to limit the spread of rumor, the rumor may surprisingly spread more widely.
As shown above, under certain settings the model does not have good properties anymore and consequently the rumor blocking problem becomes more complicated in such scenarios.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigate the problem that whether or not the rumor can be effectively blocked by the agents who propagate positive cascades but do not explicitly cooperate with each other. By formulating the rumor-aware game and the rumor-oblivious game, we have shown the that under the bestresponse and the approximate-response, the equilibrium the game provides an 2-approximation and 2e+1 e+1 -approximation, respectively, with respect to the social utility, i.e., the number of nodes that are not influenced by rumor. The theoretical results herein are well supported by the experiments done on real-world networks.
As shown in this paper, the rumor containment in a distributed mode is effective for rumor blocking. Therefore, it is interesting to design rumor blocking strategies for multiple positive cascade with the concern of the cascade priority. Another direction of the future work is to study the pure Nash equilibrium of the rumor-oblivious game. In particular, it is interesting to study the circumstance under which the pure Nash equilibrium exists. Finally, as discussed in Sec. VII, the competitive cascade model becomes evasive under certain settings. To the best our knowledge, none of the prior works has considered the rumor blocking problem in such models. We leave this part as the future work.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. For each cascade C, we denote by C t be the set of C-active nodes after time step t. Now let us consider the spreading result after time step t + 1. To prove the theorem, it is sufficient to show that given the C t , for each cascade C, and b t u for each u at time step t, the distributions of the spread result after time step t + 1 are the same under the two spread processes. In particular, because the cascade priorities are the same under the both process, it suffices to prove that, for any inactive node u * and any active node v * , the probability that v * successfully actives u * at time step t + 1 under the first spreading process is the same as that under the second one.
Process a. An active node v * successfully activates the inactive node u * at time step t + 1 if and only if u * ∈ b t v * , v * select u * to activate and the activation is successful. By Def. 3, this probability is
|b t v * | . Process b. According to Def. 4, v * will try to activate u * at time step t + 1 if and only if α g v * (u * ) = d v * − |b t v * | + 1 and p g (v * ,u * ) = 1. Since each permutation has the same probability to be generated, for each node u ∈ b t v * , α g v * (u) = d v * −|b t v * |+ 1 happens with the same probability. Therefore, for the node u * , with the probability of 1 |b t v * | , v * will try to activate u * at time step t + 1. Thus, under this process, that probability that v * successfully activates u * at time step t + 1 is still
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. Let v i be the node in a i such that dis g (v i , u * ) = dis g (a i , u * ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
⇒: Clearly, dis g (a r , u * ) = +∞. Since u * is activated by rumor, there is path P from a certain node v r ∈ a r to u * such that all the nodes in this path are activated by rumor and t g A (u * ) = |P |. By definition, dis g (a r , u * ) ≤ |P |. By Corollary 1, t g A (u * ) ≤ dis g (v i , u * ) for each i, which implies dis g (a r , u * ) ≤ |P | = t g A (u * ) ≤ dis g (v i , u * ). ⇐: Now suppose dis g (a r , u * ) ≤ dis g (a i , u * ) for each i and dis g (a r , u * ) = +∞. Let v r be the node in a r such that dis g (v r , u * ) = dis g (a r , u * ) and P be the shortest path from v r to u * in g. Suppose the nodes in P are u 1 , ..., u l where u 1 = v r and u l = u * . It suffices to show that every node u j in P will be activated by rumor at time dis g (u 1 , u j ). We prove this inductively. Clearly, t g A (u 1 ) = dis g (u 1 , u 1 ) = 0 and u 1 is activated by rumor. Suppose this is true for the first j nodes in P and u j+1 is activated by its certain in-neighbor v * . There are two cases shown as follows.
Case 1: v * = u j . By the inductive hypothesis u j is activated by rumor at time dis g (u 1 , u j ). Therefore, v j+1 is also activated by rumor and t g A (u j+1 ) = t g A (u j ) + w g (u j , u j+1 ) = dis g (u 1 , u j ) + w g (u j , u j+1 ) = dis g (u 1 , u j+1 ).
Case 2: v * = u j . Suppose v * is activated at t g A (v * ) via a certain path P from a certain seed node v to v * . Then, u j+1 is activated at |P | + w g (v * , u j+1 ). By Corollary 1, |P | + w g (v * , u j+1 ) = t g A (u j+1 ) ≤ dis g (u 1 , u j+1 ).
Furthermore, since dis g (u 1 , u * ) = dis g (a r , u * ) ≤ dis g (a i , u * ), dis g (u 1 , u j+1 ) ≤ dis g (v i , u j+1 ) for each i. Since P together with (v * , u j+1 ) is a path from v to u j+1 , dis g (u 1 , u j+1 ) ≤ |P | + w g (v * , u j+1 ). Combining Eq. (7), dis g (u1, uj+1) = |P | + w g (v * , vi+1) = t g A (vj+1).
By the inductive hypothesis, u j is C r -active at dis g (v 1 , u j ) and it will attempt to activate u j+1 at dis g (v 1 , u j ) + w g (u j , u j+1 ) = dis g (u 1 , u j+1 ), which means u j and v * activate u j+1 at the same time. Since the rumor has the highest priority, u j+1 will be activated by rumor at time step dis g (u 1 , u j+1 ). By the above induction, all the nodes in path P , including u * , are C r -active.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Proof. By the definition of δ i (·), Eq. (4) directly follows. Let δ g i (A) = γ g (A) − γ g (A(i, ∅) ). To prove Eq. (5), it suffices to show that k i=1 δ g i (A) ≤ γ g (A) holds for each full-action A and g. Note that
Thus, proved.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. Suppose Ω = (b 1 , ..., b k ). For two node sets V 1 and V 2 , we denote by V V2 1 the set of the nodes in V 1 but not in V 2 , i.e., V V2 Due to submodularity, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
According to the monotonicity of γ(),
{by the approximate response}
(1 − e −1 ) −1 · δ i (A * )
{by Eq. (5)} ≤ (1 − e −1 ) −1 · γ(A * ).
Thus, proved. 
